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Abstract 
Owing to changes in the business environment, there has been a tremendous adoption of in-
novative workplace organisation (WO) and human resource (HR) practices during the last few 
decades. Assuming a holistic perspective on human resource management (HRM), the present 
study establishes the hypothesis of mutually reinforcing WO and HR practices that, thus, con-
stitute a so-called high-performance work system. Precisely, it is argued that there may be a 
complementary relationship between a more decentralised way of allocating tasks and deci-
sion rights on the one hand and continuing training (or skilled labour), incentive pay or a more 
intensive use of long-term, as opposed to temporary, employment on the other. This hypothe-
sis is examined empirically using latest nationally representative panel data of about 2,500 
firms in Switzerland and applying econometric estimation techniques on the basis of an aug-
mented Cobb-Douglas production function. The estimation results show statistically signifi-
cant complementarities between the WO and HR practices mentioned above. In addition, so-
called innovative HRM systems of mutually reinforcing WO and HR practices increase firm 
performance significantly. These results are robust to unobserved firm heterogeneity and to 
the problem of reversed causality. 
JEL Classification: C23, J24, J31, J42, M5, M12 
Keywords: strategic human resource management, HRM bundles, firm performance 
 1 
1. Introduction 
During the last few decades, changes in the business environment have led to reorganisation 
in corporations in favour of a delegation of decision making authority to subordinate hierar-
chical levels in connection with multitasking. Essentially, five factors are seen as being the 
driving force behind the introduction of multitasking and decentralised organisational struc-
tures (Snower 1999; Lindbeck and Snower 2000; Caroli, Greenan and Guellec 2001): (1) 
technical advances in the field of production technology that enable the firm to employ flexi-
ble production systems, (2) technical advances in the field of information technology that fa-
cilitate data processing and communication within the firm, (3) a relative increase in the sup-
ply of qualified personnel who are adept at utilizing the new technologies, (4) modified 
preferences of the employee towards more interesting and responsible task performance, (5) 
changed consumer preferences in the sense that consumers attribute less value to standardised 
products, instead preferring greater variety.  
Owing to these changes in the business environment, the adoption of innovative workplace 
organisation (WO) or human resource (HR) practices during the last few decades has been 
tremendous. Kato and Morishima (2002) report diffusion rates for Japanese firms over a 32-
year period. They consider practices that provide information sharing at the top management 
level through “Joint Labour-Management Committees” (JLMCs), employees’ participation in 
decision making at the grassroots level through “Shop-Floor Committees” (SFCs), and finan-
cial incentives through “Employee Stock Ownership Plans” (ESOPs) and “Profit Sharing 
Plans“ (PSPs). In 1960, JLMCs were used by 38% of all firms in the authors’ economy-wide 
representative sample. In 1992, this proportion was 80%. During the same time period, the 
respective figure for SFCs has risen from 11% to 41%; for ESOPs from 4% to 95%; and for 
PSPs from 5% to 22%.  
Many firms use innovative workplace practices aiming at enhancing decision making partici-
pation by employees. In Osterman’s (1994) sample of US manufacturing establishments from 
1992, 64% have a high penetration1 of one to four practices out of (i) teamwork, (ii) job rota-
tion, (iii) total quality management, and (iv) quality circles. Of those that use at least one of 
these practices, 56% use more than one. So, the majority of those establishments that use in-
novative workplace practices apply bundles of such practices. A review of the OECD (OECD 
                                                 
1
 The author defines high penetration as a situation in which over 50% of employees are covered by the respec-
tive practice.  
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1999) reports a similar pattern for a sample of eight European countries2. Here, 56% of all 
establishments introduced at least one innovative practice from 1993-96 out of (i) flattening of 
management structures, (ii) greater involvement of lower level employees, (iii) team-based 
work organisation, (iv) job rotation. Of these establishments, 48% introduced bundles of prac-
tices. So, it seems that those firms that reorganise often implement more than just one practice 
at the same time. Own calculations using the 2000 wave of the KOF firm panel described later 
in this paper reaffirm this pattern. 68% of all firms have introduced one or more practices out 
of (i) teamwork, (ii) job rotation, (iii) more decentralised decision-making, (iv) delayering 
between 1995 and 2000. Of these, 54% introduced bundles of practices. This suggests that 
there may be a benefit in implementing bundles of (complementary) WO and HR practices. 
Finally, several authors conclude from their descriptive analyses that there is no obvious pat-
tern as of which WO or HR practices are combined with one another (Osterman 1994 for the 
USA, OECD 1999 for Europe).  
This findings support the claim that different resources within a corporation should fit, i.e. 
they should complement each other contingent on other firm characteristics. Within the theory 
of factor complementarities, two factors are called Edgeworth complements if the effect of 
one factor on the dependent variable depends on the level of another factor (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990, 1995). If this is the case, synergies between the respective variables can be ex-
ploited so that “the whole is more than the sum of the parts” (Cohen et al. 2003). In the con-
text of reorganisation in firms this means that the performance effects of workplace organisa-
tion measures which enhance decision rights delegation and multitasking (teamwork, job 
rotation) may be larger if they are combined with other HR practices, such as, e.g., incentive 
pay, continuing training, or temporary employment. 
The aim of this study is twofold. First, HR practices that are complementary to multitasking 
and delegation of decision-making authority are searched for. In particular, I separately con-
sider incentive pay, continuing training, and temporary employment. The importance of these 
HR practices is elaborated on the ground of Principal-Agent-theoretical reasoning. Second, 
the impact of bundles of WO and HR practices, so-called HRM systems, on firm performance 
is estimated. In particular, I consider teamwork, job rotation and delegation of decision-
making authority as means of workplace practices and the HR practices already mentioned.  
                                                 
2
 This sample refers to a survey undertaken by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (EPOC 1997). Ten countries were covered by this survey: Sweden, UK, France, Nether-
lands, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The figures in the text exclude Spain and Italy for 
reasons given in OECD (1999: 203, table 4.12).  
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For this purpose, nationally representative panel data of about 2,500 firms in Switzerland, 
collected by the Swiss Economy Institute (KOF) at the ETHZ (Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich) in 2005 and 2008, are used. The KOF firm panel is especially rich on the 
coverage of WO and HR variables. On the basis of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production 
function, performance estimations are undertaken econometrically. Preferred performance 
measures are productivity – i.e., sales – and efficiency – i.e., sales divided by labour costs (see 
Cappelli and Neumark 2001). It is important to also examine the latter performance measure 
and to compare it to the former, because incentive pay is likely to increase a firm’s payroll, 
thus partially offsetting potential positive productivity effects of work reorganisation (Oster-
man 2006). Complementarity effects between WO and single HR variables are captured by 
interaction terms in the sense of Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000). System effects as a 
whole are captured by HRM system dummy variables (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 
1997).  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical back-
ground of this study and elaborates the importance of the HR practices that are used in the 
empirical investigation presented later in this paper. Section 3 shortly discusses related em-
pirical literature and emphasises the contribution of this study. Section 4 contains the empiri-
cal investigation reported in this study. At first, the dataset and the variables used are intro-
duced and some descriptive results are provided. Subsequently, I explain the econometric 
modelling and present the results regarding (i) potential complementary effects between the 
WO and HR practices and (ii) the performance effects of HRM systems. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Underlying Theories 
Recent review articles in strategic human resource management (HRM) have made the claim 
for assuming a holistic perspective on HRM, because HR practices are interrelated and thus 
may allow to exploit synergies in boosting organisational performance (Subramony 2009, 
Lepak et al. 2006, Combs et al. 2006, Delarue et al. 2008, see also Roca-Puig et al. 2008). 
Correspondingly, researchers should consider bundles of HR practices and not just single iso-
lated practices. Indeed, there is much literature on so-called high-performance work systems, 
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describing the performance effects of an innovative HRM system, i.e. a bundle of mutually 
reinforcing HR practices (a recent review is provided by Boxall and Macky 2009).  
This “holistic” claim is rooted in the theory of factor complementarities (TFC), which has 
been conceptualised by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) using lattice theory and the notion 
of supermodular functions. According to these authors, two factors are called Edgeworth 
complements if the effect of one factor on the dependent variable depends on the level of an-
other factor (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). If this is the case, synergies between the respective 
variables can be exploited so that “the whole is more than the sum of the parts” (Cohen et al. 
2003), which means that the effect resulting from a simultaneous adjustment is larger than the 
sum of the effects of individual adjustments of the variables. Then it is optimal to establish a 
system of mutually reinforcing WO and HR variables. So the TFC regards WO or HR activi-
ties not as isolated functions but as elements of an integrated concept for corporate govern-
ance. 
Leading management theories also support the notion of complementary practices, factors or 
assets. The Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm stresses the importance of critical, non-
substitutable and non-imitable resources that are supposed to create a sustainable competitive 
advantage for a firm. In this context, interdependent resources or so-called co-specialised as-
sets play an important role, because a combined application of these practices provides an 
additional barrier for competitors to substitute or imitate the superior resource position of the 
firm. So, both approaches, the TFC and the RBV, have in common that they consider main-
taining internal fit of the workplace organisation and HRM (Guthrie et al. 2009).  
The framework of ability, motivation and opportunity (AMO) is another related approach, 
which is often used in strategic HRM (Paauwe 2009). This approach focuses on employees’ 
ability (through skills and qualification), motivation (through intrinsic and extrinsic incen-
tives) and opportunity (through an adequate organisation of work and providing employees 
with the necessary information for their tasks) to contribute to corporate success. Addition-
ally, the AMO framework stresses the importance of horizontal alignment among the AMO 
elements and vertical alignment of the AMO elements with the firm’s business strategy. Hori-
zontal alignment basically means coordinating workplace organisation and HR practices. So, 
again, the TFC and the AMO framework have in common that they pay much attention to 
internal fit.  
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2.2 Complementary HR Practices 
According to OECD (1999) and Edwards and Wright (2001), a more decentralised way of 
allocating tasks and decision rights is the key to a holistic perspective on HRM. Following a 
central line of argument picked up by the principal-agent theory, a main benefit of delegating 
a job to an agent results from the fact that the principal can make use of the agent’s superior 
knowledge with respect to the execution of the job. This is of special relevance if local infor-
mation is needed for performing a task. The main drawback, however, is characterised by the 
potential moral-hazard problem in the case of asymmetrical distribution of information, i.e. 
the risk that the agent may behave opportunistically, so that the principal could even be better 
off by abstaining from delegation and re-centralising decision making instead. The described 
situation is also known as the dilemma of organisational theory (Mookherjee 2006, Aghion 
and Tirole 1997, DeVaro 2008).  
Against this background, HR practices could serve as complements, i.e. they could mitigate 
negative side effects or strengthen positive effects of multitasking and decision-making dele-
gation on performance.3 The reverse, of course, could hold true as well, i.e. multitasking and 
decision-making delegation could complement certain HR practices. In this sense, as is ar-
gued in the present study, a conscious combination of workplace organisation and HRM can 
help solving the organisational dilemma. Specifically, I hypothesise that incentive pay, con-
tinuing training, and a more intensive use of long-term, as opposed to temporary, employment 
play an important role in constituting a HPWS – together with a more decentralised way of 
allocating tasks and decision rights. These HR practices will be discussed in turn. 
A key problem of teamwork is the free rider problem, which is well-known in a prisoners’ 
dilemma situation. The rents of cooperating are distributed to all team members, whereas the 
working effort has to be borne by the individual. As a consequence, cooperation between ra-
tional team members won’t be achieved – at least not in a one-shot game. To solve this prob-
lem, speaking game-theoretically, the pay-offs to the players have to be changed. Incentive 
pay is a HR practice that helps doing this (Möller 2007). Employees could be granted a bonus 
                                                 
3
 In general, Horgan and Mühlau (2006) consider three processes which can cause complementarities among HR 
practices or between HR and workplace practices: reinforcement, flanking and compensation. Reinforcement 
refers to a HR practice whose performance effect is not strong enough to have a measureable impact. One exam-
ple is communication which is always, like every signal, combined with some sort of noise. The stronger the 
noise, the more likely it is that the signal is misinterpreted. So, additional signals (i.e. HR practices) may be 
needed to avoid misinterpretation. Flanking refers to a setting in which one practice supports another practice 
achieving its goals more effectively. For instance, continuing training will lead to a higher learning success if 
employees are motivated to acquire new skills. Compensation refers to a HR practice that mitigates negative side 
effects of another HR practice. A prominent example for a negative side effect is crowding out of intrinsic moti-
vation by introducing incentive pay. In this example, a compensating HR practice could be teamwork. 
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if a certain target has been achieved. Recognising that one’s compensation depends on the 
effort of others, team members will keep an eye on each other, thus producing some pressure 
to perform. A small team size can make it easier to establish norms on the “right” effort level 
(Kandel and Lazear 1992). Alternative ways of paying for performance would be gain shar-
ing, which could also be done on a team output basis, or stocks or stock options (Backes-
Gellner, Lazear and Wolff 2001). Incentive pay motivates the employees to contribute to firm 
performance. 
Multitasking and delegation of decision rights necessitate corresponding skills, because it 
could be counterproductive to let employees make certain decisions without providing them 
with the knowledge that is necessary to do so in a well-founded manner (Birdi et al. 2008, 
Möller 2007). So continuous training, i.e. investing in firm-specific human capital, increases 
the returns to multitasking and decision rights delegation, thereby serving as a complement. 
The same holds true for general human capital (Caroli and van Reenen 2001). Additionally, 
since teamwork implies interdependencies between actions of the team members, they have to 
adjust their activities to each other in order to achieve the optimal output. To do this, soft 
skills, like communication capabilities etc., are needed. Finally, to implement job rotation 
effectively, employees have to be able to execute multiple tasks, again implying the need to 
train them on the necessary skills. Continuous training gives the employees the abilities they 
need to contribute to firm performance.  
Even if employees are given the ability, motivation and opportunity to contribute to firm per-
formance, they may still be reluctant to do so. An innovative HR strategy is aimed at employ-
ees making suggestions to increase labour productivity. This bears the risk of making their 
own jobs redundant, if sales do not increase proportionally. For this reason, it has been argued 
that firms following an innovative HR strategy described so far should guarantee the job secu-
rity to their workers to reduce employees’ fear of downsizing (Brown, Reich and Stern 1993, 
Milgrom and Roberts 1995, Frick 2002, Felstead and Gallie 2004, Möller 2007). Following 
Cappelli and Neumark (2004) and Roca-Puig et al. (2008), temporary employment can be 
regarded as a proxy to employment insecurity of an establishment’s workforce. The use of, 
e.g., fixed-term contracts or temporary agency workers in an establishment does not only im-
ply a lower level of temporary employees’ job security, relative to regular employees, but can 
also have adverse effects on core workers’ perceived job security because they may feel 
threatened (Roca-Puig et al. 2008; Beckmann and Kuhn 2009; see also Chattopadhyay and 
George 2001; Davis-Blake, Broschak and George 2003). According to this reasoning, work-
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ers’ productivity-enhancing suggestions could be fostered by lowering the use of temporary 
employment. Consequently, temporary employment would be hypothesised as being a substi-
tute for decision-making delegation, implying a negative interaction term in an econometric 
estimation.4  
However, concerning the use of temporary employment, a rivalry view exists, which relates to 
the core-periphery-hypothesis (see, e.g., Roca-Puig et al. 2008). The core-periphery-
hypothesis, which has intensively been debated theoretically and challenged empirically in 
recent years (see, e.g., Pfeifer 2005, Cappelli and Neumark 2004, Gramm and Schnell 2001, a 
review is provided by Kalleberg 2001), predicts a positive and complementary relationship 
between the use of numerical (temporary employment) and functional (teamwork, job rota-
tion) flexibility. The aim of the core-periphery-approach is to internally implement a dual 
labour market that buffers core, or regular, workers by employing peripheral, or contingent, 
workers. This is supposed to lead to lower voluntary and involuntary turnover among core 
employees, to a higher level of commitment to the firm among core employees and eventually 
to better organisational performance. A strategy that implements the core-periphery-
hypothesis posits that it is superior to use multiple means (numerical flexibility and functional 
flexibility) to achieve one goal (namely, enhancing firm performance by being able to react 
flexibly to demand fluctuations). The core-periphery-hypothesis would imply a complemen-
tary relationship between temporary employment and multitasking (teamwork, job rotation). 
So, with respect to temporary employment, there exist two rival hypotheses. This fact calls for 
an empirical investigation.  
Summarizing the hypotheses developed in this section, a complementary relationship is ex-
pected between multitasking and decision-rights delegation on one hand and incentive pay 
and training (or skilled labour) on the other. With respect to temporary employment, there are 
theoretical arguments for both a complementary and a substitutional relationship. Putting 
things together, a bundle of several WO and HR practices, constituting a so-called high-
performance work system, should be expected to lead to superior firm performance. 
                                                 
4
 Additionally, temporary employment could also be a substitute for multitasking. In a situation in which demand 
and sales slump, layoffs could be suggested. However, to execute given job security pledges, it may be necessary 
to shift jobs from one department, division, or function to another. Thus, job rotation may be a workplace prac-
tice whose performance effect may be increased by job guarantees and, accordingly, decreased by the use of 
temporary workers. 
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3. Related Literature 
3.1 Complementary HR Practices 
Regarding HR practices that have the potential to influence top management’s choice of how 
to allocate tasks and decision rights within a firm, I first turn to incentive pay. Cappelli and 
Neumark (2001) run fixed-effects estimations using matched panel data of over 400 observa-
tions on US manufacturing establishments and provide evidence of existing complementari-
ties between profit sharing and teamwork that are robust to unobserved heterogeneity. Bon-
ing, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) base their analysis on 34 establishments that are 
representative for the US steel sector and could be observed over 60 months. The authors es-
timate a measure of productivity that gives the percentage of produced steel that meets the 
quality standards. Controlling for fixed effects, they find a significantly positive interaction 
term of teamwork and group incentive pay as well as a significantly positive three-way inter-
action term of team work, group incentive pay and a measure of production process complex-
ity. The latter result indicates that allocating tasks and decision rights to the bottom is espe-
cially effective in complex (production) environments. Finally, Möller (2007) uses nationally 
representative data on over 15,000 German establishments and applies a quasi-panel method 
introduced by Black and Lynch (2001)5 to control for unobserved heterogeneity in estimating 
value added. She finds significantly positive interaction terms of decentralization (delegation 
of decision rights) and gain sharing as well as decentralization and having a stock-ownership 
programme. Analogous interaction terms with teamwork instead of decentralization are insig-
nificant.  
Turning to continuous training, Birdi et al. (2008) estimate the value added of 308 UK manu-
facturing firms over a 22-year period. Their fixed-effects results find a significantly positive 
interaction term of teamwork and training. Möller (2007) finds a significantly positive interac-
tion term of decentralization and training. Altogether, this implies a complementary relation-
ship between multitasking and delegation of decision-making authority on the one hand and 
training (investing in human capital) on the other.  
                                                 
5
 Möller (2007) has only cross-sectional information on key explanatory variables available, but longitudinal 
information on value added. So she applies a two-step procedure introduced by Black and Lynch (2001). The 
first step consists of a within-estimation of a production function. From this estimation, the establishment fixed 
effect can be retrieved. In the second step, this fixed effect is regressed on the key explanatory variables and a set 
of control variables. 
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Lastly, the evidence on temporary employment is less clear-cut. Arvanitis (2005) examines 
the same nationally representative data set of about 1,400 firms in Switzerland that is also 
used for the present study. He tests interactions between external numerical and functional 
flexibility. The former means a high use of temporary employment (e.g., fixed-term contracts 
or temporary agency work), whereas the latter refers to multitasking (teamwork, job rotation), 
delegation of decision-making authority and a decrease in the number of hierarchical levels. 
The author’s cross-section OLS heteroscedasticity-robust estimates reveal an insignificant 
coefficient of the functional flexibility variable for those firms that have a high level of nu-
merical flexibility. This implies neither support for nor contradiction to the core-periphery-
hypothesis.  
However, Michie and Sheehan (2005) estimate the percentage change of total sales, the per-
centage change of labour productivity and the percentage change of pre-tax profitability of 
360 establishments from the UK manufacturing and service sector. For all dependent vari-
ables in their cross-sectional estimations, the authors find a significantly positive interaction 
between external numerical flexibility and an additive HR index, which includes, among other 
things, employee participation and flexible job design. Moreover, Michie and Sheehan-Quinn 
(2001) use a sample of 240 UK manufacturing establishments to explain a subjective measure 
of relative financial performance6. The authors find a significantly positive interaction be-
tween numerical (temporary employment) and functional (multitasking) flexibility on the one 
hand and an additive HR index which includes, among other things, teamwork and flexible 
job assignments on the other. These results suggest a rather complementary relationship be-
tween temporary employment and a decentralised way of allocating tasks and decision rights, 
thus supporting the core-periphery-hypothesis. 
On the contrary, other authors (Lepak, Takeuchi and Snell 2003, Roca-Piug et al. 2008) report 
evidence for a substitutional relationship between functional and numerical flexibility, thus 
contradicting the core-periphery-hypothesis. However, although they use temporary employ-
ment as proxy for numerical flexibility, they use the level of employees’ education or the 
level of employers’ training efforts as proxy for functional flexibility. Since, in the present 
study, functional flexibility is operationalised by multitasking and delegation of decision-
making authority, these studies seem not to be completely comparable at this point. 
                                                 
6
 “The dependent variable is as follows: How does this site’s current financial performance/profitability compare 
with other establishments in the same industry?” (Michie and Sheehan-Quinn 2001: 293) 
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3.2 HRM Systems 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) use up to 2,190 monthly observations on 36 US steel 
finishing lines to estimate operational productivity7 by fixed-effects regressions. The authors 
distinguish four HRM systems. HRM4 contains no innovative HR practice at all. HRM3 is 
defined as having initiated worker involvement in teams and enhanced labour-management 
communication. HRM2 adds extensive skills training and a high level of worker involvement 
in teams to the elements of HRM3. HRM1 furthermore adds extensive screening of new 
workers, job rotation, multitasking, and an implicit employment security pledge to the ele-
ments of HRM2. The authors label HRM4 the most traditional system, whereas they consider 
HRM1 the most innovative one. Each establishment in the sample is attributed to one of these 
HRM systems. The resulting HRM system dummy variables serve as explanatory variables in 
estimating establishment productivity. According to the results reported by the authors the 
impact of a HRM system is the larger the more innovative it is.  
Kato and Morishima (2002) use panel data on 126 Japanese manufacturing firms over a pe-
riod of 20 years. The authors consider participation practices on the top level and on the shop-
floor level as well as financial incentive schemes through stock ownership and gain sharing 
programmes. Comprehensively controlling for fixed effects and reversed causality, they find 
significantly positive productivity effects of the most innovative HRM system.  
Horgan and Mühlau (2006) report results of a cross-sectional study on 80 Irish and 300 Dutch 
establishments. Their HRM system consists of incentive pay, training, information sharing, 
career development and extensive recruitment. For the Irish sample, a high-performance 
HRM system performed significantly better, as measured by the questionnaire’s key infor-
mant’s subjective assessment of employee performance8. With respect to the Dutch sample, 
results are different. Here, a high-performance HRM system performed significantly worse.  
3.3 Contribution of the Present Study 
The present study adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, it is the first study to 
examine performance effects of HRM systems on a panel basis for Switzerland. Second, this 
is the first study ever to analyse a nationally representative Swiss data set with respect to po-
tential complementary effects between multitasking and decision rights delegation on the one 
                                                 
7
 This operational productivity indicator is called uptime. “Uptime is the percent of scheduled operating time that 
the line actually runs” (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997: 293). 
8
 Employee performance refers to: job performance, employee cooperation, problems with theft, drug and alco-
hol, absenteeism, and negligence (Horgan and Mühlau 2006: 427).  
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hand and incentive pay or continuous training on the other. Studying Swiss data appears to be 
especially interesting because labour relations are in some ways similar to those in the US or 
UK (e.g., rather low influence of unions on the wage-setting process) while at the same time 
being in other ways similar to labour relations in Germany (e.g., relatively high importance of 
dual apprenticeship training). Therefore, an empirical investigation on Swiss firms may pro-
vide a valuable contribution to that field. Third, against the background of less clear-cut re-
sults in the literature on potential complementarities that involve temporary employment, the 
present study adds some evidence in favour of the core-periphery-hypothesis. Fourth, regard-
ing the sectoral distribution of existing studies, there are only few that use representative data 
for the whole economy (e.g., Arvanitis (2005) for Switzerland, Möller (2007) for Germany, 
and DeVaro (2008), Procter and Burridge (2008), and Wood and de Menezes (2008) for the 
UK). Often, manufacturing or, more specifically, steel establishments or firms are examined 
(e.g., Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997; Cappelli and Neumark 2001). Empirical results 
can be generalised only by using nationally representative data which is done in the present 
study.  
Finally, the panel structure of the data set used in the present study allows tackling two major 
methodological issues. First, unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics (such as manage-
ment quality) are likely to influence both performance and WO or HR variables. Being en-
dowed with more than one observation per firm allows controlling for unobserved firm het-
erogeneity. Second, as noted by many scholars, the problem of reversed causality deserves 
special attention (e.g., Paauwe 2009; Wood and Wall 2007; Combs et al. 2006; Boselie, Dietz 
and Boon 2005; Wright et al. 2005; Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). This view is supported by 
the evidence which is provided by Nickell, Nicolitsas and Patterson (2001) according to 
whom firms that face low demand or competitive or financial problems are more likely to 
reorganise. Despite this, only few studies have tried to correct for this endogeneity bias in the 
past (e.g., Bauer 2003; Colombo, Delmastro and Rabbiosi 2007; DeVaro 2008). Therefore, in 
the present study, alternative specifications are tested using not only present but also lagged 
key explanatory variables. 
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4. Empirical Investigation 
4.1 Data, Variables, Correlations 
The data used in the present study were collected by the Swiss Economy Institute (KOF) at 
the ETHZ (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich) in 2005 and 20089. This panel data 
set covers a nationally representative stratified sample of about 2,500 firms in Switzerland. 
Stratification criteria are 28 sectors and three categories of size. The KOF firm panel is espe-
cially rich on the coverage of workplace organisation (WO) and human resource (HR) vari-
ables. Firms with less than 20 employees were dropped because key explanatory variables 
were not available for them.  
Dependent variables are log sales, measured in CHF (lnY) – to provide an indicator for pro-
ductivity – and log sales minus log wages or, equivalently, the log of sales over wages 
( WYln , where W is the total payroll of a firm) – to provide an indicator for labour efficiency 
(see Cappelli and Neumark 2001). It is important to also examine the latter performance 
measure because incentive pay may increase a firm’s payroll, thus partially offsetting poten-
tial positive productivity effects of work reorganisation (Osterman 2006).  
Key explanatory WO variables are (i) the extent of the use of teamwork on a 0-5 scale, stan-
dardised (team_std), (ii) the extent of the use of job rotation on a 0-5 scale, standardised 
(rot_std), and (iii) the degree of decentralization of decision-making authority between an 
employee and his/her supervisor (decentr_std). This decentralisation index is created by sum-
ming up seven variables that are each measured on a five-point Likert scale, so that the result-
ing index is on a 0-28 scale.10 Since the first two variables indicate the degree of multitasking 
(task_std) within a firm, they are combined in the following way:  
task_std = team_std + rot_std. 
An overall WO index, covering both multitasking and decentralization of decision-making 
authority, is:  
WO_std = task_std + decentr_std. 
                                                 
9
 It is planned to repeat this survey every three years so that, in 2011/12, even more sophisticated estimation 
techniques than those presented later in this paper can be applied.  
10
 These questions cover different fields of how work is organised: Who decides upon the pace of work? Who 
decides upon the course of tasks to be executed? Who allocates the tasks among employees? Who decides upon 
the way how tasks are executed? Who is responsible in case of problems in the production process? Who is re-
sponsible for the contact to customer? Who deals with customer complaints? 
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Key explanatory HR variables are (i) the percentage of employees that have taken part at con-
tinuous training curses during the last year (train), (ii) the percentage of employees that hold a 
university of higher education degree (skilled), (iii) the importance of incentive pay that de-
pends on individual, team, or corporate performance, on a 0-12 scale, standardised (incen-
tive_std)11, and (iv) the importance of temporary employment as a means of flexibility on a 
five-point Likert scale (temp_std). Since the first two variables are indicators of the level of 
human capital within a firm (HC_std), they are combined in the following way:  
HC_std = train_std + skilled_std. 
Control variables are: gross investments (lnK), measured in CHF as proxy for capital input, 
number of employees (lnL) as proxy for labour input, the year in which the firm has been 
founded (founded), whether the firm is foreign or domestic owned (foreign), the export share 
relative to total sales (export), the numbers of competitors on a five-point Likert scale, stan-
dardised (compet_std)12, the intensity of competition concerning price or non-price conditions 
on a 0-8 scale, standardised (intens_std), whether a firm has introduced (i) product innovation, 
(ii) process innovation, or (iii) process innovation with significant reduction in production 
costs on a 0-3 scale, standardised (inno_std), technological potential outside of the firm (sci-
entific knowledge base etc.) on a 0-4 scale, standardised (tech_std) and controls for seven 
sectors and seven regions. Descriptive statistics on all variables are displayed in table A1 in 
the appendix.  
To get a first idea of the bundle nature of the variables just described, tables 1 and 2 report 
spearman correlation coefficients of all key explanatory variables. Table 1 lists those explana-
tory variables that are used for the search for complementary HR practices. Table 2 lists those 
explanatory variables that are used to build the HRM systems.  
[Insert tables 1 and 2 about here]  
As can been seen, most correlations are significant and positive, indicating that firms often 
use these WO and HR practices simultaneously. However, such correlations could be caused 
by managers’ preferences for these practices or just by fashion. For this reason, simple corre-
lation analyses of WO and HR practices are not sufficient to identify complementarities 
                                                 
11
 Each of the three questions – dependence on individual, dependence on team, and dependence on corporate 
performance – is measured on a five-point Likert scale.   
12
 Thereby, a value of 1 refers to 1-5 competitors, 2 refers to 6-10 competitors, 3 refers to 11-15 competitors, 4 
refers to 16-50 competitors, and 5 refers to more than 50 competitors. 
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(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000). Therefore, the next two subsections report econometrical analy-
ses based on the estimation of production functions. 
4.2 Complementary HR Practices  
4.2.1 Econometric Model 
The present study employs an approach that has been used by Huselid and Becker (1997) and 
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and that follows directly from the definition of 
Edgeworth complements. To detect potential complementarities between an innovative work-
place organisation, characterised by a high level of multitasking and decentralised decision 
making, and various HR practices, such as training (or skilled labour), incentive pay and tem-
porary employment, an Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated which is augmented 
by three dummy variables (D1-D3) indicating a firm’s “innovativeness” with respect to its 
workplace organisation (WO) and various HR practices. The splitting point is set at the me-
dian value. So for instance, regarding WO and training, D1 indicates that the respective firm 
has an above-median value of the WO index and a below-median value of training. D2 indi-
cates that the respective firm has a below-median value of the WO index and an above-
median value of training. D3 indicates that the respective firm has an above-median value of 
both the WO index and training. The reference category is represented by firms with a below-
median value of both indices (D0). An analogous procedure applies to skilled labour, incentive 
pay and temporary employment, each separately combined with WO. Table A2 in the appen-
dix is meant to make this procedure more clear. Table A3 in the appendix shows the distribu-
tion of the dummy variables for each of the HR variables. As noted by Bresnahan, Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt (2000), it need not necessarily be the case that each dummy variable has the 
same mean. The cross-section estimation equation is: 
t
n
j jtjtttttt uXDDDLKY +++++++= ∑ =1332211210 lnlnln δγγγβββ ,   (1) 
where ut is an i. i. d. random variable and t refers to the wave of 2008. It is often argued that 
high-performance firms can afford to introduce “innovative” WO or HR practices. This re-
versed-causality problem can lead to biased cross-sectional estimates. Therefore, an alterna-
tive specification is tested in the present study using lagged key explanatory variables: 
t
n
j jtjtttttt uXDDDLKY +++++++= ∑ =−−− 11,331,221,11210 lnlnln δγγγβββ ,  (2) 
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where t-1 refers to the 2005 wave. Still, estimates could be biased, if some unobserved time-
invariant firm characteristics (such as management quality) have an influence on both the de-
pendent and one or more key explanatory variables. Therefore, a two-stage-procedure, intro-
duced by Black and Lynch (2001) and applied, e.g., by Zwick (2006), Ludewig and Sadowski 
(2009), Beckmann and Kuhn (2009) as well as others, is also applied here. The first step con-
sists of a within-estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function using the 2005 and 2008 
waves: 
itiititit uvYEARLKY +++++= ηβββ lnlnln 210 .      (3) 
From this estimation, the firm fixed effect can be retrieved (Verbeek 2004): 
YEARLKYv iFEiFEii ηββ ˆlnˆlnˆlnˆ 21 −−−= ,       (4) 
where the bars over the variables represent the corresponding mean values. In the second step, 
this fixed effect is regressed on the dummy variables (D1-D3) and a set of control variables X: 
i
n
j jiji XDDDv ∑ = +++++= 13322110ˆ ζδγγγγ ,      (5) 
where ζi is an i. i. d. random variable. The estimated coefficients 321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ γγγ  are of special inter-
est, because they represent the particular effect of the dummy variables (D1-D3) on the fixed 
effect of an establishment’s productivity. It is important to note that, in this specification, the 
dummy variables (D1-D3) are from 2005, while the fixed effect is from 2005 and 2008. Given 
this setting, there should not be any remaining reversed causality problems left. So, from a 
theoretical point of view, this is the researcher’s preferred specification. For the efficiency 
specification it is proceeded analogously.  
4.2.2 Empirical Results 
Tables 3 and 4 display the results of the estimation of complementary HR practices. Due to 
space limitations, only the coefficients of D1-D3 as well as F-tests of equality of D1-D3 with 
each other are shown.13 In table 3, the dependent variable is productivity. In table 4, the de-
pendent variable is labour efficiency. In each table, there are four panels: one for each of the 
HR practices (training, skilled labour, incentive pay, temporary employment). Each panel 
reports four regressions: one for the cross-section 2008 to provide a baseline specification, 
                                                 
13
 The full regression outputs can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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two for the specification with lagged key explanatory variables (with and without the full set 
of control variables14) to correct for reversed causality, and one for the second step of the 
Black/Lynch two-step-procedure to correct for unobserved heterogeneity and reversed causal-
ity. The first step regressions are shown in table A4 in the appendix. 
[Insert tables 3 and 4 about here]  
As can be seen from the coefficients and F-tests shown in table 3, firms with an innovative 
workplace organisation (i.e., an above-median level of decentralised tasks and decision rights) 
and a high (i.e., an above-median) level of training (D3) perform significantly better than 
those firms that also feature a high level of training but still have a more traditional workplace 
organisation (i.e., an below-median level of decentralised tasks and decision rights) (D2). 
Turning to skilled labour, it becomes even more convincing that firms with an innovative 
workplace organisation and a highly-skilled workforce (D3) perform significantly better than 
either firms with just a innovative workplace organisation (D1) or with just a highly-skilled 
workforce (D2). Regarding incentive pay, there is no clear pattern but – if at all – that an in-
novative workplace organisation alone (D1) seems to be preferable to a strong incentive 
scheme alone (D2). Finally, with respect to temporary employment, there appears to be clear 
evidence that a combined use of both temporary employment and decentralised allocation of 
tasks and decision rights (D3) is superior to a high level of temporary employment alone (D2). 
Estimates in table 4 concerning efficiency reach basically the same results as those in table 3 
concerning productivity. However, coefficient sizes and significance levels are lower. This 
indicates that part of the productivity gain through simultaneous adjustment of several HR 
practices is shared with employees through higher wages. But, on net, firms still profit from 
such reorganisational measures. Overall, the results reported in this subsection provide evi-
dence in favour of complementarities between multitasking and decision-rights delegation on 
one hand and several HR practices – i.e., training, skilled labour, incentive pay, and tempo-
rary employment – on the other.  
                                                 
14
 However, each regression also includes capital and labour – except for the 2-step regressions which use these 
controls in the first step – as well as controls for seven economic sectors and seven geographical regions. The 
regressions labelled “no controls” lack the following control variables: founded, foreign, export, compet_std, 
intens_std, inno_std, tech_std. These variables are described in part 4.1.  
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4.3 HRM Systems 
4.3.1 Econometric Model 
In the preceding subsection, the focus has been on pairwise complementarities. There, the 
purpose was to empirically indentify potential elements of a high-performance work system. 
The purpose of the present subsection is to go one step further and integrate all complemen-
tary WO and HR variables considered in this study into HRM systems. Proceeding that way, a 
procedure is chosen which is similar to that used in Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), 
Kato and Morishima (2002) or Horgan and Mühlau (2006). An auxiliary variable is created 
counting how many WO or HR variables of a firm assume an above-median value. The fol-
lowing practices are considered here: teamwork, job rotation, decentralised decision making, 
human capital, incentive pay, temporary employment.15 Those firms that always score below 
the median are assigned to the system HRM0. Those that score above the median in one (two, 
three, …) variable are assigned to the system HRM1 (HRM2, HRM3, …). Table A5 in the ap-
pendix shows the distribution of the auxiliary variable. Since there are not enough firms scor-
ing high in five or six WO or HR variables, they are all assigned to the system HRM4. Table 
A6 in the appendix displays the distribution of the six WO and HR variables across the vari-
ous HRM systems. As can be seen, HRM4 is the most “innovative” system. The specification 
for the estimation relies, again, upon a Cobb-Douglas production function that is augmented 
by HRM system dummy variables: 
t
n
j jtjk ktkttt uXHRMLKY +++++= ∑∑ == 1
4
1210
lnlnln δγβββ .    (6) 
As in the preceding subsection, the estimates could be biased due to reversed causality and 
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics. Therefore, the same alternative specifications 
are tested here. For redundancy reasons, the reader is referred to part 4.2.1.  
4.3.2 Empirical Results 
The estimation results are displayed in tables 5 and 6. In table 5, the dependent variable is 
productivity. In table 6, the dependent variable is labour efficiency. Each table reports six 
regressions: two for the cross-section 2008 (with and without the full set of control vari-
ables16), two for the specification with lagged key explanatory variables, and two for the sec-
                                                 
15
 See table 2 for correlations among these variables.  
16
 However, each regression also includes capital and labour – except for the 2-step regressions which use these 
controls in the first step – as well as controls for seven economic sectors and seven geographical regions. The 
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ond step of the Black/Lynch two-step-procedure. The first step regression is shown in table 
A4 in the appendix. 
[Insert tables 5 and 6 about here]  
As can be seen from both tables, there is consistent evidence that the most innovative HRM 
system (HRM4) is associated with a significantly higher productivity and efficiency than the 
reference category (neither WO nor HR practices). Depending on the specification, there is 
also a significant performance effect of the systems HRM2 or HRM3. This result strongly con-
firms the notion of a positive link between human resource management systems and firm 
performance. Additionally, it can be seen that productivity effects are larger than efficiency 
effects, again indicating that productivity gains are shared between firms and employees.  
5. Conclusion 
So-called high-performance work systems are thought of as bundles of mutually reinforcing 
workplace organisation (WO) and human resource (HR) practices. The present study aimed at 
testing this complementary hypothesis in the Swiss context based on a nationally representa-
tive firm panel data set. Econometric estimations of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production 
function reveal the following key results. First, the combined use of a decentralised allocation 
of tasks and decision rights and of a qualified workforce allows exploiting synergies with re-
spect to firm performance. Second, increasing incentives for employees by attaching more 
importance to pay for performance may have the potential to lead to adverse effects on firm 
performance if a traditional workplace organisation stays unchanged. Third, the core-
periphery-hypothesis gains support insofar as a combination of functional and numerical 
flexibility is superior to an isolated use of either multitasking and decentralised decision-
making or temporary employment. Finally, a human resource management system consisting 
of four or more WO or HR practices leads to considerable performance effects. These results 
are robust to unobserved firm heterogeneity and to the problem of reversed causality. 
On the theoretical level, the evidence reported in this study supports the recent claim made by 
several review articles in strategic human resource management (HRM) in favour of assuming 
a holistic perspective on HRM (Subramony 2009, Lepak et al. 2006, Combs et al. 2006, 
Delarue et al. 2008, see also Roca-Puig et al. 2008). This leads to basic management implica-
                                                                                                                                                        
regressions labelled “no controls” lack the following control variables: founded, foreign, export, compet_std, 
intens_std, inno_std, tech_std. These variables are described in part 4.1.  
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tions for practitioners. HRM has a great potential to increase organisational performance. This 
holds especially true if WO and HR practices are combined effectively. 
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 VI 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Spearman correlation coefficients between workplace organisation and HR practices 
 WO_std train_std skilled_std incentive_std temp_std 
WO_std 1.000     
      
train_std 0.270*** 1.000    
 (0.000)     
skilled_std 0.290*** 0.248*** 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000)    
incentive_std 0.120*** 0.013 0.067** 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.703) (0.041)   
temp_std 0.046 -0.034 0.015 0.080** 1.000 
 (0.166) (0.300) (0.659) (0.015)  
Legend:  Regression Subsample Cross Section 2008, n = 922 
 rho (p-value)     
 
 
Table 2: Spearman correlation coefficients between elements of HRM systems 
 team_std rot_std decentr_std HC_std incentive_std temp_std 
team_std 1.000      
       
rot_std 0.129*** 1.000     
 (0.000)      
decentr_std 0.114*** -0.038 1.000    
 (0.001) (0.253)     
HC_std 0.262*** 0.036 0.257*** 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.281) (0.000)    
incentive_std 0.177*** 0.113*** -0.059* 0.030 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.076) (0.366)   
temp_std 0.103*** 0.028 -0.030 -0.036 0.080** 1.000 
 (0.002) (0.396) (0.361) (0.274) (0.015)  
Legend:  Regression Subsample Cross Section 2008, n = 922 
 rho (p-value)     
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Table 3: Regression results: Complementary HR practices explaining productivity 
Dependent Variable: lnY 
 Cross section 08 Lagged Di-s Lagged Di-s 
(no controls) 
2-Step 
 
D1-D3: TRAIN 
D1 0.244*** 
(0.000) 
0.196** 
(0.015) 
0.233*** 
(0.007) 
0.173* 
(0.065) 
D2 0.130** 
(0.037) 
0.028 
(0.715) 
0.028 
(0.725) 
0.089 
(0.254) 
D3 0.223*** 
(0.003) 
0.123 
(0.134) 
0.204** 
(0.013) 
0.326*** 
(0.001) 
R2 0.7855 0.8224 0.8024 0.2797 
N 922 542 542 708 
Test D1 = D2 2.74* 2.83* 3.84* 0.71 
 (0.0985) (0.0932) (0.0507) (0.400) 
Test D2 = D3 1.73 1.09 3.64* 5.62** 
 (0.1892) (0.2967) (0.0571) (0.0180) 
Test D1 = D3 0.08 0.63 0.09 1.78 
 (0.7734) (0.4275) (0.7596) (0.1821) 
 
D1-D3: SKILLED 
D1 0.156*** 
(0.006) 
0.150* 
(0.077) 
0.182** 
(0.036) 
0.112 
(0.195) 
D2 0.176*** 
(0.006) 
0.224*** 
(0.001) 
0.295*** 
(0.000) 
0.109 
(0.240) 
D3 0.352*** 
(0.000) 
0.324*** 
(0.000) 
0.438*** 
(0.000) 
0.423*** 
(0.000) 
R2 0.7877 0.8258 0.8100 0.2864 
N 922 542 542 708 
Test D1 = D2 0.07 0.83 1.73 0.00 
 (0.7931) (0.3638) (0.1889) (0.9726) 
Test D2 = D3 5.70** 1.71 3.48* 7.89*** 
 (0.0172) (0.1918) (0.0627) (0.0051) 
Test D1 = D3 6.41* 4.14** 8.48*** 6.72*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0423) (0.0038) (0.0097) 
 
D1-D3: INCENTIVE 
D1 0.149*** 
(0.006) 
0.252*** 
(0.001) 
0.304*** 
(0.000) 
0.224*** 
(0.004) 
D2 -0.129** 
(0.036) 
0.042 
(0.538) 
0.077 
(0.283) 
-0.013 
(0.883) 
D3 0.150** 
(0.038) 
0.077 
(0.302) 
0.180** 
(0.021) 
0.181 
(0.102) 
R2 0.7854 0.8240 0.8036 0.2765 
N 922 542 542 708 
Test D1 = D2 14.64*** 4.88** 5.81** 5.31** 
 (0.0001) (0.0276) (0.0163) (0.0214) 
Test D2 = D3 10.32*** 0.15 1.28 2.25 
 (0.0014) (0.6973) (0.2586) (0.1342) 
Test D1 = D3 0.00 4.31** 2.13 0.14 
 (0.9814) (0.0385) (0.1450) (0.7134) 
 
D1-D3: TEMP 
D1 0.083 
(0.194) 
0.135* 
(0.082) 
0.207*** 
(0.010) 
0.185** 
(0.038) 
D2 -0.118** 
(0.030) 
-0.054 
(0.481) 
-0.023 
(0.782) 
0.050 
(0.521) 
D3 0.194*** 
(0.004) 
0.101 
(0.178) 
0.178** 
(0.015) 
0.323*** 
(0.001) 
R2 0.7861 0.8224 0.8024 0.2784 
N 922 542 542 708 
Test D1 = D2 8.43*** 4.20** 5.57** 1.94 
 (0.0038) (0.0409) (0.0187) (0.1644) 
Test D2 = D3 22.2*** 2.64 4.41** 7.23*** 
 (0.0000) (0.1047) (0.0363) (0.0073) 
Test D1 = D3 2.27 0.20 0.13 1.59 
 (0.1319) (0.6554) (0.7162) (0.2080) 
Legend: 
 
Coefficient / test statistic 
(p-value) 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 
10/5/1%-level 
Notes: All 16 regressions include labour and capital – except for the 2-step regressions which use 
these controls in the first step – as well as 6 regional and 6 sector dummies. 
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Table 4: Regression results: Complementary HR practices explaining efficiency 
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/W) 
 Cross section 08 Lagged Di-s Lagged Di-s 
(no controls) 
2-Step 
 
D1-D3: TRAIN 
D1 0.152*** 
(0.001) 
0.116* 
(0.069) 
0.149** 
(0.027) 
0.111* 
(0.094) 
D2 0.031 
(0.510) 
0.048 
(0.401) 
0.051 
(0.384) 
-0.002 
(0.966) 
D3 0.126** 
(0.013) 
0.072 
(0.281) 
0.134** 
(0.038) 
0.146** 
(0.022) 
R2 0.2875 0.3331 0.2940 0.2848 
N 908 533 533 693 
Test D1 = D2 4.55** 0.82 1.63 2.95* 
 (0.0332) (0.3652) (0.2024) (0.0861) 
Test D2 = D3 3.01* 0.11 1.49 6.20** 
 (0.0833) (0.7378) (0.2235) (0.0130) 
Test D1 = D3 0.22 0.35 0.04 0.22 
 (0.6419) (0.5549) (0.8443) (0.6398) 
 
D1-D3: SKILLED 
D1 0.113** 
(0.016) 
0.108* 
(0.088) 
0.133** 
(0.037) 
0.130** 
(0.033) 
D2 0.042 
(0.359) 
0.093 
(0.119) 
0.135** 
(0.024) 
0.090 
(0.107) 
D3 0.173*** 
(0.001) 
0.119* 
(0.099) 
0.210*** 
(0.003) 
0.201*** 
(0.004) 
R2 0.2884 0.3342 0.3000 0.2874 
N 908 533 533 693 
Test D1 = D2 1.70 0.04 0.00 0.32 
 (0.1928) (0.8370) (0.9796) (0.5691) 
Test D2 = D3 6.54** 0.14 1.19 2.75* 
 (0.0107) (0.7057) (0.2763) (0.0977) 
Test D1 = D3 1.05 0.02 1.06 0.76 
 (0.3059) (0.8794) (0.3037) (0.3832) 
 
D1-D3: INCENTIVE 
D1 0.106** 
(0.018) 
0.146** 
(0.028) 
0.187*** 
(0.007) 
0.160*** 
(0.004) 
D2 -0.073* 
(0.100) 
0.083 
(0.122) 
0.100* 
(0.068) 
0.049 
(0.384) 
D3 0.107** 
(0.032) 
0.078 
(0.173) 
0.150*** 
(0.009) 
0.116* 
(0.070) 
R2 0.2886 0.3355 0.2969 0.2855 
N 908 533 533 693 
Test D1 = D2 11.16*** 0.72 1.36 2.56 
 (0.0009) (0.3972) (0.2438) (0.1103) 
Test D2 = D3 9.16*** 0.00 0.60 0.76 
 (0.0026) (0.9456) (0.4394) (0.3835) 
Test D1 = D3 0.00 0.90 0.28 0.37 
 (0.9733) (0.3439) (0.6000) (0.5448) 
 
D1-D3: TEMP 
D1 0.072 
(0.138) 
0.099 
(0.121) 
0.154** 
(0.016) 
0.124** 
(0.031) 
D2 -0.042 
(0.302) 
0.017 
(0.756) 
0.036 
(0.534) 
0.005 
(0.922) 
D3 0.154*** 
(0.008) 
0.046 
(0.483) 
0.101 
(0.114) 
0.145** 
(0.019) 
R2 0.2899 0.3327 0.2944 0.2845 
N 908 533 533 693 
Test D1 = D2 6.09** 1.63 3.23* 3.27* 
 (0.0138) (0.2019) (0.0729) (0.0709) 
Test D2 = D3 14.64*** 0.19 0.95 4.33** 
 (0.0001) (0.6630) (0.3300) (0.0378) 
Test D1 = D3 1.90 0.60 0.65 0.08 
 (0.1681) (0.4372) (0.4204) (0.7725) 
Legend: 
 
Coefficient / test statistic 
(p-value) 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 
10/5/1%-level 
Notes: All 16 regressions include labour and capital – except for the 2-step regressions which use 
these controls in the first step – as well as 6 regional and 6 sector dummies. 
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Table 5: Regression results: HRM systems explaining productivity 
Dependent Variable: lnY 
 Cross section 08 Lagged HRMi-s 2-Step 
  no controls  no controls  no controls 
HRM1 0.029 
(0.663) 
0.037 
(0.598) 
0.070 
(0.459) 
0.095 
(0.290) 
-0.068 
(0.500) 
-0.049 
(0.649) 
HRM2 0.029 
(0.651) 
0.090 
(0.196) 
0.214** 
(0.031) 
0.279*** 
(0.004) 
0.084 
(0.422) 
0.108 
(0.341) 
HRM3 0.232*** 
(0.003) 
0.302*** 
(0.000) 
0.084 
(0.395) 
0.192** 
(0.047) 
0.127 
(0.273) 
0.227* 
(0.069) 
HRM4 0.162** 
(0.049) 
0.283*** 
(0.002) 
0.088 
(0.481) 
0.218* 
(0.097) 
0.351** 
(0.045) 
0.600*** 
(0.001) 
R2 (overall) 0.7843 0.7658 0.8222 0.8011 0.2794 0.2057 
N 922 922 542 542 708 708 
Legend: 
 
Coefficient  
(p-value) 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 
10/5/1%-level 
Notes: All 6 regressions include labour and capital – except for the 2-step regressions 
which use these controls in the first step – as well as 6 regional and 6 sector 
dummies. 
 
 
Table 6: Regression results: HRM systems explaining efficiency 
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/W) 
 Cross section 08 Lagged HRMi-s 2-Step 
  no controls  no controls  no controls 
HRM1 -0.011 
(0.845) 
-0.006 
(0.923) 
0.043 
(0.582) 
0.052 
(0.479) 
-0.038 
(0.571) 
-0.024 
(0.719) 
HRM2 -0.029 
(0.608) 
0.007 
(0.902) 
0.138* 
(0.092) 
0.173** 
(0.028) 
0.066 
(0.347) 
0.069 
(0.321) 
HRM3 0.101 
(0.104) 
0.144** 
(0.026) 
0.027 
(0.747) 
0.082 
(0.309) 
0.026 
(0.742) 
0.062 
(0.433) 
HRM4 0.098 
(0.155) 
0.172** 
(0.017) 
0.153* 
(0.092) 
0.230*** 
(0.009) 
0.080 
(0.419) 
0.165* 
(0.079) 
R2 (overall) 0.2856 0.2422 0.3371 0.2980 0.2802 0.2471 
N 908 908 533 533 693 693 
Legend: 
 
Coefficient  
(p-value) 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 
10/5/1%-level 
Notes: All 6 regressions include labour and capital – except for the 2-step regressions 
which use these controls in the first step – as well as 6 regional and 6 sector 
dummies. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
lnY 922 17.279 1.428 12.827 23.121 
ln(Y/W) 884 -3.402 0.593 -4.500 0.000 
lnL 922 4.683 1.124 3.045 9.063 
lnK 922 13.707 1.773 8.517 18.857 
team 922 2.292 1.712 0.000 5.000 
rot 922 0.548 1.222 0.000 5.000 
task 922 2.839 2.226 0.000 10.000 
course 922 1.464 0.874 0.000 4.000 
distribution 922 0.996 0.761 0.000 4.000 
execution 922 1.512 0.928 0.000 4.000 
pace 922 1.720 0.808 0.000 4.000 
problems 922 1.095 0.803 0.000 4.000 
contact 922 1.679 1.166 0.000 4.000 
complaints 922 1.150 0.970 0.000 4.000 
decentr 922 9.616 3.751 0.000 21.000 
train 922 30.120 28.714 0.000 100.000 
skilled 922 21.575 18.771 0.000 100.000 
HC 922 51.696 36.858 0.000 185.000 
incentive_ind 922 3.238 0.789 0.000 4.000 
incentive_team 922 1.839 1.132 0.000 4.000 
incentive_corp 922 2.406 1.087 0.000 4.000 
incentive 922 7.483 2.279 1.000 12.000 
temp 922 1.550 1.263 0.000 4.000 
founded 922 1943.706 44.182 1610.000 2005.000 
foreign 922 0.178 0.383 0.000 1.000 
export 922 27.011 35.553 0.000 100.000 
compet 922 2.441 1.402 1.000 5.000 
tech 922 2.841 1.108 1.000 5.000 
intens 922 5.044 1.409 0.000 8.000 
inno 922 1.296 1.103 0.000 3.000 
reg1 922 0.081 0.274 0.000 1.000 
reg2 922 0.215 0.411 0.000 1.000 
reg3 922 0.151 0.358 0.000 1.000 
reg4 922 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 
reg5 922 0.195 0.397 0.000 1.000 
reg6 922 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000 
reg7 922 0.039 0.194 0.000 1.000 
sec1 922 0.524 0.500 0.000 1.000 
sec2 922 0.121 0.327 0.000 1.000 
sec3 922 0.133 0.340 0.000 1.000 
sec4 922 0.044 0.206 0.000 1.000 
sec5 922 0.054 0.227 0.000 1.000 
sec6 922 0.085 0.278 0.000 1.000 
sec7 922 0.038 0.191 0.000 1.000 
compet_std 922 0.000 1.000 -1.028 1.824 
intens_std 922 0.000 1.000 -3.579 2.097 
inno_std 922 0.000 1.000 -1.175 1.545 
tech_std 922 0.000 1.000 -1.661 1.948 
team_std 922 0.000 1.000 -1.338 1.582 
rot_std 922 0.000 1.000 -0.448 3.645 
task_std 922 0.000 1.000 -1.276 3.217 
decentr_std 922 0.000 1.000 -2.564 3.035 
 XI 
WO_std 922 0.000 1.000 -2.626 3.008 
train_std 922 0.000 1.000 -1.049 2.434 
skilled_std 922 0.000 1.000 -1.149 4.178 
incentive~td 922 0.000 1.000 -2.844 1.982 
temp_std 922 0.000 1.000 -1.227 1.939 
      
Note: Basis: Productivity regression 2008 
 
 
Table A 2: Concept of median split 
 
  
 
 
TRAIN 
  
INCENTIVE 
 
Median split high train low train  Median split high incentive low incentive 
high WO D3 D1  high WO D3 D1 
low WO D2   low WO D2  
 
  
 
 
SKILLED 
  
TEMP 
 
Median split high skilled low skilled  Median split high temp low temp 
high WO D3 D1  high WO D3 D1 
low WO D2   low WO D2  
 
 
Table A 3: Distribution of firms to cells according to table 3, column 1 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
D1-D3: TRAIN 
D0 922 0.335 0.472 0.000 1.000 
D1 922 0.248 0.432 0.000 1.000 
D2 922 0.165 0.371 0.000 1.000 
D3 922 0.252 0.434 0.000 1.000 
D1-D3: SKILLED 
D0 922 0.312 0.464 0.000 1.000 
D1 922 0.197 0.398 0.000 1.000 
D2 922 0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 
D3 922 0.303 0.460 0.000 1.000 
D1-D3: INCENTIVE 
D0 922 0.354 0.478 0.000 1.000 
D1 922 0.293 0.455 0.000 1.000 
D2 922 0.146 0.354 0.000 1.000 
D3 922 0.207 0.405 0.000 1.000 
D1-D3: TEMP 
D0 922 0.275 0.447 0.000 1.000 
D1 922 0.272 0.445 0.000 1.000 
D2 922 0.225 0.417 0.000 1.000 
D3 922 0.228 0.420 0.000 1.000 
Note: Basis: Productivity regression 2008 
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Table A 4: Regression results: 1st step of Black/Lynch-procedure 
Dependent variable: lnY ln(Y/W) 
2nd step with D1-3; HRM1-4 
lnK 
0.074 
(0.250) 
0.036 
(0.275) 
lnL 
0.397** 
(0.034) 
-0.139 
(0.477) 
yr08 
0.099** 
(0.021) 
0.052* 
(0.095) 
_cons 
14.278*** 
(0.000) 
-3.281*** 
(0.000) 
R2 (overall) 0.7243 0.0007 
F 16.51*** 2.16* 
Prob>F (0.0000) (0.0928) 
N 1,630 1,601 
n 1,367 1,349 
Legend: 
 
Coefficient / 
test statistic 
(p-value) 
*/**/*** indicates 
significance at the 
10/5/1%-level 
 
 
Table A 5: Distribution of number of HR practices 
Number of HR practices Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 77 8.35 8.35 
1 220 23.86 32.21 
2 275 29.83 62.04 
3 189 20.50 82.54 
4 128 13.88 96.42 
5 28 3.04 99.46 
6 5 0.54 100.00 
Total 922 100.00  
Note: Basis: Productivity regression 2008 
 
 
Table A 6: Description of HRM systems 
HRM-System HRM0 HRM1 HRM2 HRM3 HRM4 
N 77 220 275 189 161 
team_std -0.739 
(0.764) 
-0.470 
(0.851) 
-0.085 
(0.952) 
0.318 
(0.909) 
0.769 
(0.819) 
rot_std -0.448 
(0.000) 
-0.363 
(0.465) 
-0.079 
(0.941) 
0.158 
(1.111) 
0.660 
(1.318) 
decentr_std -0.749 
(0.681) 
-0.310 
(0.920) 
-0.052 
(1.045) 
0.307 
(0.896) 
0.510 
(0.886) 
HC_std -0.873 
(0.268) 
-0.489 
(0.736) 
0.034 
(0.969) 
0.385 
(1.018) 
0.576 
(0.974) 
incentive_std -0.645 
(0.735) 
-0.351 
(0.874) 
-0.087 
(1.009) 
0.278 
(0.964) 
0.611 
(0.877) 
temp_std -0.733 
(0.386) 
-0.309 
(0.938) 
0.005 
(1.010) 
0.159 
(1.015) 
0.577 
(0.877) 
Legend: mean 
(standard deviation) 
   
Note: All variables had been standardised to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one before HRM-systems have been created. 
Basis: Productivity regression 2008 
 
